### EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL DCI DCI #2 DDCi 3 EXDIR F4 D/ICS \_6 DDA Z DDO #8 DDS&T 9 Chm/NIC 11 | IG 12 Compt 13 D/EEO 14 D/Pers 15 DOEA 16 C/PAD/OEA 17 SA/IA 19 C/IPD/OIS 20 NID/EA Remarks: Executive Secretary 3437 ((13<sup>-8</sup>1) 9/8/82. Notified Tain Trompkins GIA response wiel not be formering tefere 9/9/82 2000


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#### **DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Washington, D.C. 20520



SEP 4 1982

#### UNCLASSIFIED (With SECRET Attachment)

TO:

Mr. Donald Gregg OVP

NSC Mr. Michael O. Wheeler

- Mr. Raymond Lett Agriculture - Mr. Gerald Pagano AID CEA - Mr. William Niskanen

CIA

Mrs. Helen Robbins

Commerce - Col. John Stanford Defense Treasury - Mr. David Pickford Mr. Dennis Whitfield USTR

SUBJECT:

NSSD-6: United States-Japan Relations

NSSD-6, United States-Japan Relations, has now been approved by all agencies participating in the study with the following changes effected in the final clearance process:

- P. 13, paragraph A, last sentence: the phrase, we do in Europe" has been deleted.
  - P. 15, paragraph B on services has been redrafted.
- P. 16, last paragraph, second sentence: the phrase, "In the absence of U.S. policy to control the transfer of developing technologies," has been deleted.
- P. 29, the final paragraph on a suggested Cabinetlevel meeting has been deleted.

While no issues remain to be decided, it was felt useful by several agencies to have an NSDD recording the principal conclusions of the IG memorandum. It would be appreciated if you could telephone SIG-level concurrence. or non-concurrence in the attached draft to Mr. Tain Tompkins at 632-5804 by COB September 8. Barring inter-Co agency differences, State will plan to forward the IG memorandum and draft NSDD to the White House for consideration by the President.

> L. Paul Bremer, III **Executive Secretary**

Attachment: As stated.

> UNCLASSIFIED (With SECRET Attachment)

ER

National Security Decision
Directive Number

### UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONS

I have reviewed NSSD-6, United States-Japan Relations, and direct that it be considered a guide for the conduct of economic and security relations with Japan. The fundamental framework for our relationship remains the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; we will work within its terms and resist any attempts to revise it.

Accordingly, on the security front, the United States will:

- o Maintain Japan's Western orientation, and discourage development of an autonomous nuclear capability.
- Seek Japanese agreement to obtain increased capabilities as soon as possible to assume defense of its own territory, its surrounding seas and skies, and its sea-lanes to a distance of 1,000 miles. We see no need for Japanese forces able to sustain operations far from Japanese territory.



DECL: OADR

- Accept the validity of Japan's policy of "comprehensive security," embracing foreign aid, and strive to see Japan's foreign assistance increased, particularly to strategically sensitive areas. We will not, however, regard foreign aid as a substitute for defense.
- o Maintain U.S.-Japan interoperability by encouraging maximum procurement from the United States, but cooperate with Japan when necessary to discourage the development of independent systems.
- Continue in our regular consultations and at highlevel meetings to urge improved Japanese defense efforts, but in public statements emphasize roles and missions in consideration of Japan's sovereignty and sensitivities.

On the economic front, the United States will:

o Persist in a continuing campaign to have the Japanese economy further opened on a broad front, and pursue effective implementation of measures Japan has already undertaken, seeking consultation on any policy or practice that seriously discriminates against imports.

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- o Encourage Japan to continue opening its financial markets, and seek at a minimum national treatment for U.S. commercial banks, security companies, and insurance companies in Japan.
- o Encourage Japan to sustain close cooperation in regard to non-subsidization of international export credits, and restraints on Soviet credits.
- o Press for national treatment for U.S. companies in Japan and seek simplification and transparency in investment procedures.
- o Seek participation for U.S. firms in Japanese hightechnology development; access to the Japanese market for U.S. high-technology firms, particularly when they have a competitive edge; and full opportunity for U.S. firms to invest in Japan in high-technology ventures.
- O Seek to prevent predatory trade practices of Japanese high-technology firms in the United States, and where possible, third countries.
- O Use fishery allocations to obtain improvement in

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tariffs and non-tariff barriers to U.S. fish exports as well as greater cooperation in joint ventures.

- o Support the whale moratorium and attempt to persuade Japan to comply with the quotas it has been allocated.
- o Expedite conclusion of new arrangements with Japan in accordance with NSDD-39.
- o Attempt to build on the new interim civil-aviation agreement with a long-term agreement that will further stabilize our civil-aviation relationship.

In order to preserve and build upon our partnership with Japan, and forestall the possibility of a major shift in our relationship the United States will:

- o Endeavor to avoid creating an impression of insensitive treatment as we pursue our security, diplomatic, and economic objectives.
- O Accord Japan the same degree and level of consultation as we do our NATO allies.
- O Sustain frequent exchanges at all levels in areas of mutual interest.

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